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Abstract 
 
Varieties of capitalism (VoC) theory predicts that national models of capitalism are enduring 
and persist in the face of economic internationalisation. This dissertation uses a comparative 
study of changes in unemployment benefit and employment protection in both EU and non-
EU coordinated market economies (CME) between 1990 and 2018 to test whether European 
integration can be associated with a loss of the comparative advantage which VoC attributes 
to labour market institutions in CMEs. It includes both Nordic and continental CMEs because 
it is hypothesised that responses to Europeanisation pressures may differ between welfare 
regimes. The study does not show any basis for the hypothesised Europeanisation effect on 
CMEs and instead suggests that EU membership may, if anything, counter wider pressures of 
globalisation to which Nordic countries appear to have been more exposed than continental 
countries.  
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Introduction 
Varieties of capitalism (VoC) is taken as a theoretical starting point for thinking about 
potentially confounding forces at work in the process of European integration. Acting in one 
direction can be adduced the supposedly resilient national models of capitalism which confer 
comparative advantages or disadvantages despite the putatively homogenising sweep of 
globalisation, liberalisation and, in this context, of European integration. But is it also possible 
to identify, acting in the other direction, aspects of European integration which potentially 
undermine the institutional particularities of different national models and with them the 
basis of their comparative advantage? Does European integration act to undermine countries’ 
institutional coherence even as it enhances opportunities through lower barriers to intra-EU 
trade, production specialisation and agglomeration?  
 
Another set of related questions underlie these ideas. Is there is a source of instability in the 
EU stemming from a mismatch between social rights created at the EU level and labour 
market institutions which remain national and which reflect national social bargains? Are 
deeply rooted national models sustainable or are they undermined by domestic pressures 
stemming from EU membership? Will the case for EU-level institutions of social solidarity, and 
the fiscal capacity to realise them, become more pressing and with what implications for 
distinctive forms of capitalism? This dissertation does not attempt to answer these broad 
questions but they are the context for its focus on the response of two key labour market 
institutions to European integration, institutions which, VoC holds, are complementary to 
each other and to institutions in other domains of the political economy. The research 
question can be stated as: 
 
Can European integration be associated with a loss of the comparative advantage which VoC 
attributes to unemployment benefit and employment protection? 
 
This narrower question is one of Europeanisation, a branch of research concerned with the 
extent to which national institutions have adapted to the pressures, incentives and ideas 
stemming from EU membership (Haverland, 2005) or more simply with “domestic change 
caused by European integration” (Vink, 2003:63). It is argued that coordinated market 
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economies (CME) are the EU countries in which VoC theory predicts a loss of comparative 
advantage and the question is evaluated, therefore, by comparing them with non-EU CMEs.  
The question is broken down into four hypotheses which are set out and evaluated after the 
theoretical considerations and methodological approach on which they are based have been 
defined. 
 
Chapter 1 gives an overview of VoC including the concepts of institutional coherence and 
institutional complementarity and the ways in which they confer comparative advantage. The 
mechanisms by which Europeanisation may impact the complementarity of labour market 
institutions to each other and to other domains of the economy are discussed. Arguments 
that EU integration may undermine not only the stability of national welfare systems but also, 
and in consequence, support for the EU itself are reviewed. As a way of validating the premise 
of the research question, the chapter concludes by identifying two critiques of VoC that can 
be tested in the unemployment benefit and employment protection data used for the study.  
 
Chapter 2 sets out the methodology, arguing for a 1990 to 2018 review period and a 
comparative study that takes account of welfare regime differences by including not only EU 
and non-EU CMEs but also Nordic and continental countries together with EU and non-EU 
LMEs. Chapter 3 sets out the rationale for the choice of unemployment benefit and 
employment protection indicators and explains the choice of data sources and the derivation 
of the extended time series which is used. Chapter 4 highlights empirical and conceptual 
difficulties with the welfare regime assumptions on which the study design relies and seeks 
to validate the country case selection using family and housing entitlements which are 
supplementary to basic unemployment benefit.  
 
Chapter 5 sets out and evaluates the four hypotheses referred to above by reference to 
graphically presented data. It argues that none of the hypotheses are supported by the data 
because reforms in EU countries are either of a lesser extent (or at least no greater) than in 
non-EU controls or that EU CMEs still retain greater CME coherence even where institutional 
shifts have been greater. It finds that scholarship showing that labour markets in EU CMEs 
have nevertheless been transformed away from CME coherence, the critiques referred to 
above, are either uncorroborated or shown to have happened too early to be plausibly linked 
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to European integration. Chapter 6 is a discussion of these evaluations in the broader context 
outlined above and the dissertation concludes with ideas for further research which would 
address acknowledged limitations in this study.  
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1. Theoretical Context 
This chapter sets out the concepts underpinning the research question with a review of both 
the VoC literature and a literature addressing questions of political economy and social 
solidarity in the context of European integration. It explores the potential mechanisms of 
Europeanisation, including EU law, rulings of the CJEU, migration, the politics of welfare 
chauvinism and the mediating effects of welfare regime. Finally, the chapter sets out a basis 
for testing two critiques of VoC theory and so for corroborating or refuting the theoretical 
premise of the research question and thus for weighing the implications of any 
Europeanisation effects identified.  
 
1.1 Varieties of capitalism 
Varieties of capitalism maintains that countries have distinct institutional structures rooted 
in their historical and cultural development. Institutions are self-reinforcing and historically 
resilient because economic actors exert political influence to maintain arrangements that 
support established business strategies and resist changes that threaten them (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). 
 
At the heart of VoC is a dichotomy between liberal market economies (LME), which rely on 
market mechanisms for co-ordination between firms and other actors, and co-ordinated 
market economies (CME) which rely instead on strategic co-ordination. LMEs and CMEs 
derive comparative advantage from institutional coherence, i.e., from a consistency of market 
or non-market mechanisms of coordination across different domains of the economy. 
Broadly, these domains are i) financial markets ii) corporate governance, iii) industrial 
relations, iv) skills formation1 and v) labour market institutions. The domains are sometimes 
headlined separately or are expanded to include domains that are arguably derivative of 
others including inter-firm relations, firm strategies, relations with employees and product-
market regulation (see variously Hall and Soskice, 2001, Hall and Gingerich, 2009, Kenworthy, 
2009, Estevez et al., 2001 and Mares, 2001). In LMEs, arms-length transactions based on 
competitive markets, publicly available information and formal contracting constitute the 
primary mechanisms of co-ordination. In CMEs co-ordination is mostly achieved through long-
 
1 Otherwise referred to as education and training. 
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term collaboration with suppliers, trade unions, financial institutions and even competitors, 
for example over product standard setting and to deliver vocational training. Mixed market 
economies (MME) combine elements of market and non-market co-ordination and therefore 
lack institutional coherence. Liberal export market economy (LEM) is a derivative category 
which refers to LMEs with high exports (see critique in section 1.6). In the VoC literature, LME 
generally refers to the Anglo-Saxon countries and CME to much of continental Europe 
(excluding the Mediterranean states), the Nordic countries, Japan and Korea. MME, by and 
large, refers to the Mediterranean states and LEMs include Ireland and much of central and 
Eastern Europe (see for example Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Hall, 2014; Hall, 2016). 
 
1.2 Comparative advantage of CMEs and LMEs 
Institutional coherence is associated with institutional complementarities which exist 
between institutions “if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or 
efficiency of) the other” (Hall and Soskice, 2001:17). LMEs and CMEs derive comparative 
advantage in different forms of production from distinctive institutional complementarities 
and it follows that changes to an institution which impairs its complementarity with other 
institutions will undermine comparative advantage and harm economic performance.  
 
Across the economic domains, LMEs are characterised by large stock markets; extensive 
shareholder power and management autonomy; firm-level wage-bargaining; autonomous 
education and training institutions; weak employment protection and minimalist but 
universal welfare. The comparative advantage of firms in the ideal-type LME derives from 
greater responsiveness to new business opportunities through financial markets that provide 
ready access to risk-capital and from management’s freedom from non-contractual 
commitments. These, it is argued, are conducive to radical innovation using advanced mobile 
skills and the rapid adoption of new technology and are reflected in, for example, a greater 
emphasis on university education and a higher rate of scientific citations in patents (Estevez-
Abe et al., 2001:172 & 175; Schneider and Paunescu, 2012). A complementary incentive 
structure of less secure employment and more conditional and less generous unemployment 
benefits favour the acquisition of high-level general skills with the widest possible application 
as individuals seek to mitigate risk by opening the broadest possible set of career options.  
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By contrast, in CMEs, strategically linked banks provide low-cost, long-term debt financing 
which facilitates high rates of investment in capital stock while reducing shareholder pressure 
for short term returns. Sector-led vocational training ensures a supply of labour with specific 
skills and is complemented by labour market institutions that incentivise workers to enter 
such training by mitigating the risk of them being stranded with skills that are not readily 
transferable. Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) identify these institutions as employment protection, 
unemployment protection and wage protection and they illustrate the complementarity of 
industrial relations, skills formation and labour market institutions. Employment protection, 
in the form of legal employment security, provides workers with one element of insurance 
against specialised skills becoming a stranded asset. Unemployment protection, in the form 
of benefits paid at high replacement rates for a reasonably long period and without requiring 
claimants to take jobs incommensurate with their skills, provides a second pillar of support to 
the value of specific skills. Wage protection secures future earnings relative to other 
occupations and is achieved through industry-wide collective-bargaining which provides 
credible commitments on the level of future earnings. Of these three labour-market 
institutions, this dissertation focuses on unemployment protection and employment 
protection, firstly, because they are direct features of public policy and, secondly, because 
cross-national longitudinal data on them are available (see Chapter 3). 
 
The comparative advantage which CMEs derive from this configuration lies in firms’ deep 
competencies in established medium to high technologies and their capacity for incremental 
innovation i.e., to continuously upgrade and diversify product lines (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
But the limits placed on management autonomy by the formal role of trade unions, restrictive 
employment legislation, the wage protection commitments outlined above and heavy 
reliance on debt finance, militate against rapid shifts in firm strategies through disposals and 
acquisitions, high-risk investment in novel technologies or workforce reconfiguration through 
redundancies and fresh hiring. Firms exert political influence to maintain institutions that 
support their business strategies, including welfare policies that incentivise workers’ 
investment in specific skills, because the costs of adjustment to new institutional 
arrangements are high (Mares, 2001). In CMEs, moreover, governments are more responsive 
to such organised interests than in LMEs (Ezrow and Hellwig, 2015).  
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In MMEs, by contrast, a mismatch between the protection and production regimes can be 
expected, with a combination of low social protection and high employment protection 
deterring investment in specific skills and impeding the adoption of high technology (Molina 
and Rhodes, 2007). Yet MMEs, despite such comparative disadvantages, still have effectively 
organised interests that oppose change. Hall (2014) argues that MMEs, unable to adjust to 
European Monetary Union, suffered a loss of competitiveness which could not be offset by 
devaluation while, by contrast, for coordinated market economies (CME), the single currency 
harnessed exchange rate stability to the comparative advantages they already enjoyed and 
which were unimpeded by wider processes of European integration. The research question 
asks whether these advantages may in fact be subject to erosion after all, as EU integration 
impinges on the domestic arenas in which successful institutional settlements are reached.  
 
1.3 Mechanisms and implications of Europeanisation  
Leibfried (2015) describes three processes through which member states’ eroded legal 
authority and regulatory capacity may challenge welfare settlements in the EU. These are 
positive integration in the form of EU law, especially on anti-discrimination; negative 
integration in the form of rulings by the CJEU, again largely concerning non-discrimination; 
and indirect market spillover effects such as competitive downward pressure on tax rates and 
a lowering of clearing wages to attract economic activity. Eurozone countries are, moreover, 
subject to fiscal constraints which potentially impact welfare spending. 
 
These processes, Leibfried argues, place limits on member state autonomy in welfare policy 
in four ways. Firstly, states can no longer limit benefit eligibility to their own citizens. 
Secondly, benefits cannot be limited to residents in the territory of the state, as in the case of 
Child Benefit in the UK. Thirdly, the rights of establishment and freedom to supply services 
upheld in, for example, Viking and Laval and Rüffert effectively represent competition from 
other social systems. 2 Fourth, states have been denied exclusive rights in the administration 
and adjudication of benefits as in, for example, the Paletta cases which enabled a claimant’s 
doctor in Italy to certify entitlement to sickness benefit in Germany, a development which, 
 
2 Viking C-438/05, Laval C-341/05 CJEU, Rüffert C-346/06 
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Leibfried reports, exposed the German system to fraud.3 The CJEU’s focus on treaty rights 
means that its rulings will principally be to disallow national regulations which impede 
mobility and it therefore has a structural bias in favour of deregulation which suits the status 
quo of LMEs but which is a threat to the welfare systems, and hence the comparative 
advantage, of continental and Scandinavian CMEs (Scharpf, 2010).4 
 
Caporaso and Tarrow (2009:594), by contrast, argue that the CJEU has created an 
“international system of social protection” based on “supranational embedded liberal 
compromises”. Here, Polanyi’s concept of markets, and the institutions of social protection 
which support them, being embedded in the societal bargains of particular countries is 
applied to the EU. But this more optimistic view has been rejected as unrealistic given the 
Single Market remains embedded in institutions of social protection which remain national 
and which are potentially destabilised by the obligations imposed on them (Ashiagbor, 2013). 
Ashiagbor argues that while such pressures were hardly significant among the founding six 
members of the EEC they grew with enlargement to the UK, Ireland and Nordic countries, 
with liberal and universalist welfare systems. By this logic, it follows that accession of the 
substantially poorer countries of central and eastern Europe has even greater potential to 
destabilise national settlements. 
 
Political action at the EU level that might protect national welfare systems or give more 
substance to Caporaso and Tarrow’s ‘international system of social protection’ is hampered 
by limited treaty competencies and the absence of resources. In fact, positive integration, 
which provides scope for constraining the market, can be seen in opposition to negative 
integration acting to extend it, an opposition which prioritises rulings of the CJEU over EU law 
(Offe, 2003). Scharpf refers to an ‘institutional asymmetry’ between the strong policy making 
role of judges and the high consensus requirements that impede political action given the 
overlay of right-left and integration-anti-integration cleavages. One analysis of this 
configuration of supranational governance holds that it may pose a threat to the EU itself. By 
challenging member states’ social-democratic settlements, it also threatens their liberal 
 
3 Paletta C-45/90 & C-206/94  
4 Scharpf refers to both ‘social’ and ‘co-ordinated’ market economies at different points in the article without 
distinguishing between Esping-Andersen’s social democratic and conservative welfare typologies.  
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constitutional orders by opening the way to populist authoritarianism and Euroscepticism (de 
Búrca, 2018).  
 
1.4 Intra-EU migration and welfare 
Migration is a key mechanism through which Europeanisation effects can operate and 
migrant rights were effectively at stake in the legal cases cited, albeit indirectly. But migration 
potentially challenges the social and political basis of solidarity which, as Streeck, states, is 
built on cross-class settlements “forged at the level of nation states” (Streek, 2016:246). There 
is an extensive literature on the interplay between models of capitalism, welfare and 
immigration with the idea that immigration can undermine the social and political embedding 
of markets being a key theme. It is a literature in which the impact of immigration on support 
for welfare states and on their viability is the “most rapidly expanding area of research” and 
it is one in which the specific case of European integration plays an important role (Afonso 
and Devitt, 2016:597). 
 
In theory, expanded rights for EU citizens from other member states have the potential to 
strain national welfare systems. But even perceptions of such cost pressures may undermine 
support for EU integration and give rise to ‘welfare chauvinism’ which seeks to limit eligibility 
to country nationals. Welfare regimes are founded to varying degrees on what Hall (2017) 
calls ‘actuarial’ and ‘citizenship’ conceptions of legitimacy, concepts which are germane to 
welfare typologies including Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three worlds of welfare. The 
conservative, contributory model rests largely on actuarial legitimacy and the social-
democratic and liberal types on citizenship. Afonso and Devitt (2016) state that whether 
Esping-Andersen’s welfare types are differently subject to immigration pressures remains 
unanswered by research but they note that, logically, universal systems should be under 
greater fiscal pressure than contributory systems which enable greater segmentation of 
rights. Empirical analysis by Kim and Zurlo (2009), at least, confirms that immigration induces 
greater pressure on social-democratic than on conservative or liberal regimes. 
 
The evidence on fiscal impacts, however, tends to confound public fears even in high spending 
countries. Burgoon (2014) reports that for most European countries the net fiscal burden of 
immigration is less than 1 percent of GDP. But even this relatively small cost may result from 
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immigration from outside the EU. In the UK, for example, from 1995 to 2011, migrants from 
the EEA contributed on average 10% more than natives while non-EEA migrants contributed 
9% less (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). Notwithstanding historically high social spending, 
Martinsen and Rotger (2017) conclude that EU migrants make a significant net positive fiscal 
contribution in Denmark. But ungrounded fears can be politically salient and as consequential 
as empirically justified ones. Survey data from 20 European countries showed greater concern 
over the fiscal impact of immigration than over labour market competition (Preston, 2014). 
Beaudonnet (2015) showed that, on average, 50 percent of Europeans see European 
integration as a potential threat to their welfare entitlements including 70 percent in France 
and 65 percent in Germany. She finds support for European integration is lowest in countries 
with the most generous welfare systems, among those most dependent on welfare and 
among individuals who subjectively feel least protected by it. Similarly, Baute et al. (2018) 
identify the greatest fear of European integration in countries with the highest social spending 
although fears over social spending are no greater than over other issues related to EU 
membership. Research by Hall (2017) found welfare chauvinism to be greater in countries 
with means-tested liberal regimes than in universal social-democratic systems and this 
chimes with Beaudonnet’s finding that those who feel least protected by welfare fear 
European integration the most and with Burgoon (2009), who links more limited welfare 
systems to greater hostility to globalisation. Across the EU in countries with both more and 
less generous welfare systems, constituencies exist for whom apparently unjustified but at 
least explicable and politically salient forms of loss-aversion have electoral and policy 
consequences including the rise of right-wing populism.  
 
The Danish People’s Party has made the segmentation of entitlements between Danish 
nationals and migrants into a coalition forming strategy (Careja et al., 2016) and a debate on 
the legitimacy of Denmark’s universal welfare state has been fueled by the frustration of 
attempts to limit extra-territorial and extra-national eligibility (Greve, 2014). In supporting 
centre-right coalitions, the Sweden Democrats, have argued for separate budgets for 
migrants and Swedish-born nationals (Bó et al., 2018). While there is no evidence to support 
the ‘welfare magnet’ thesis in either Denmark or Germany, the German welfare system is 
showing signs of a bifurcation which disadvantages EU migrants (Martinsen and Werner, 
2019). Similarly, Kramer et al. (2018) argue that welfare systems in Denmark and the 
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Netherlands have ‘quarantined’ mobile EU citizens through creative redrawing of entitlement 
rules.  
 
Country responses appear to be driven more by political than fiscal pressures or, to use 
Afonso and Devitt’s terminology, more by political than functional logic (2016:597), a logic 
that plays out in both electoral competition and in the formation of coalitions and with the 
potential to undermine established welfare systems. Right-wing populist parties, although 
relying heavily on the support of blue-collar, left-inclined voters who support welfare 
programmes and labour market regulation, find they can only gain office as junior coalition 
partners with conservative parties that are more likely to support cuts in both (Roth et al., 
2018). They are faced, therefore, with a choice between betraying their voters or opposing 
their coalition partners and losing office (Afonso, 2015). Assuming right-wing populist parties 
have broader platforms that make office-taking electorally worthwhile, a bias towards 
retrenchment appears logical.  
 
Whether EU integration has in fact impacted unemployment benefit is not clear in the 
literature but relevant studies use data that are now too old to capture responses to the most 
consequential stages of EU integration. Starke et al.’s (2008) welfare convergence study of 18 
OECD countries tested both aggregate spending and net replacement rates (NRRs) from 1980 
to 2003 (2002 for NRRs). In the case of unemployment benefit they found more convergence 
in replacement rates than spending but could identify no clear Europeanisation effect among 
the EU countries in their panel. Schmitt and Starke (2011) focus instead on changes in social 
spending as a percentage of GDP between 1980 and 2005 and do find greater convergence 
among EU than non-EU countries for some programmes although they were unable to test 
this effect for unemployment benefit. These studies highlight both the value of more recent 
data and the importance of selecting an appropriate dependent variable. 
 
1.5 EU integration and employment protection legislation (EPL) 
By contrast with unemployment and other welfare entitlements, there is a relative lack of 
empirical research on the pressures that induce EPL reforms (Riekhoff, 2017; Emmenegger, 
2009) and although various factors have been linked to them, the literature focuses mostly 
on the impacts of globalisation rather than specifically on EU integration. Trade-openness 
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(exports plus imports as a proportion of GDP), has been linked to EPL reform in general 
(Riekhoff, 2017) or only to permanent EPL reform (Fischer and Somogyi, 2009). Potrafke 
(2013), on the other hand, finds no link between globalisation and labour market 
deregulation. It is more likely to be resisted by left-wing governments (Riekhoff, 2017) and 
where there is strong worker bargaining power (Emmeneger, 2013; Saint-Paul, 2002). But, as 
Jensen et al. (2014) argue, EPL can be used as a cheap substitute for unemployment benefit 
with cuts to benefit being compensated by stronger employment protection. Conversely, EPL 
deregulation may accompany more generous benefit to offset the increased risk of 
unemployment, a shift to ‘flexicurity’ actively promoted by the European Commission as part 
of the European Employment Strategy (EES) which has put effective pressure on EU members 
to reform domestic labour market institutions through recommendations and non-binding 
targets (Paetzold and Van Vliet, 2014). Changes to EPL, therefore, may be an indirect 
Europeanisation effect stemming from changes to unemployment benefit or stem more 
directly from policy coordination. 
 
1.6 Putting varieties of capitalism to the test 
This dissertation tests a hypothesised Europeanisation effect on two policy variables and it 
does so to explore whether European integration potentially undermines the coherence of 
national varieties of capitalism. Unemployment benefit and employment protection 
legislation, the chosen variables, are significant among the sub-domains of the political 
economy on which VoC theory is founded and are integral to the coherence or incoherence 
of its models. While the hypothesised Europeanisation effects can be tested on the data, 
conclusions on their systemic implications will be more conjectural and rest on the cogency 
of VoC as a theoretical framework, on whether changes to unemployment benefit and 
employment protection legislation do in fact represent a loss of comparative advantage 
through eroded institutional complementarities.  
 
Varieties of capitalism has become a “dominant” perspective within comparative political 
economy (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016:177; Thelen, 2019:298), a field which bifurcates 
between various theories of liberalisation, convergence or globalisation on one hand and 
theories which promote persistent national models on the other. But aspects of it are 
challenged, including its claims on innovation, the stability of regimes and the institutional 
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coherence and complementarities ascribed to its models. Hall and Soskice’s (2001) claim that 
LMEs are more successful at radical innovation than CMEs rests in part on a tally of patents, 
rates of academic citations in patents and the volume of scientific publications over two five-
year periods (Taylor, 2009). Using a larger dataset and longer timescale, Taylor fails to 
replicate Hall and Soskice’s predictions and finds that, in any case, they rely heavily on the 
inclusion of the United States which is an outlier in terms of scale, the role of military spending 
in driving scientific innovation and the advantages of a reserve currency. Crouch (2009) 
questions whether New Zealand really has a higher capacity for innovation than Germany, 
Sweden or Switzerland as Estevez-Abe et al. (2001:175) imply in a ranking of scientific 
citations and he suggests that the traditions and incentives of common law as compared to 
civil law may explain higher patent filing rates in LMEs just as the dominance of English in 
academic publications may account for the higher rate of academic citations. 
 
The stability of VoC types has also been questioned. In firms’ efforts to escape competitive 
pressures through internationalisation, Streeck and Thelen (2009) see processes of 
displacement, layering, differential growth, drift and exhaustion that allow incremental 
liberalisation to proceed without political mobilisation and notwithstanding the path-
dependence and positive feedback loops which theoretically sustain the different varieties of 
capitalism. Schneider and Paunescu (2012), tracking eight indicators across four domains of 
the political economy from 1990 to 2005, identify a transformation from CME to LME or ‘LME-
like’ status in Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. This largely Nordic liberal shift 
is reflected in a new ‘flexicurity’ of flexible labour markets and universal social safety nets 
while continental CMEs have moved towards ‘dualisation’ between secure labour market 
insiders and outsiders in more precarious temporary employment or unemployment (Thelen, 
2014).  In Thelen’s critique, the different logics of conservative and social-democratic welfare 
traditions have driven an increasingly marked bifurcation between continental and Nordic 
CMEs. Germany, in particular, is characterised by decreasing social solidarity while the Nordic 
response has been to secure the sustainability of universal welfare systems by driving up 
employment rates through a liberalising shift to softer employment rights.  
 
The key idea of institutional coherence across all domains of the political economy has been 
questioned. Kenworthy (2009) disputes the empirical basis of Hall and Gingerich’s (2009) 
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claims of a correlation between measures of coherence and superior growth. Witt and 
Jackson (2016) argue that Germany and Japan have enhanced innovation through liberalising 
corporate governance while maintaining coordination in other domains, succeeding through 
an example of institutional incoherence at odds with a key tenet of VoC. 
 
In fact “critical commentaries” of VoC “abound”, although most promote theories of 
globalisation, liberalisation or convergence rather than proposing alternative categories of 
national political economy (Baccaro and Pontusson, 2016:179). ‘Growth models’, however, 
classify countries according to the relative importance of exports and consumption growth 
which, in turn, reflect the preferences of dominant social blocs in the distribution of income. 
Baccaro and Pontusson, for example, argue that the falling wage-share in GDP which has 
accompanied Germany’s export success reflects the relative power of capital over labour; that 
high consumption in the UK reflects the interests of the financial sector; and that balanced 
growth in Sweden stems from a political stalemate.   
 
Meanwhile VoC has evolved by incorporating components of growth as a criterion of 
classification and by adding liberal export market economy as a new variety (see for example 
Hall, 2014; Hope and Soskice, 2016), accommodations which, it has been claimed, “protect 
the model from falsification at the price of watering it down” (Streeck, 2016:244). In a 
challenge to its claim of causal analysis, Crouch (2009) accuses VoC of relying on the selection 
of empirical detail to justify pre-determined Weberian ideal types.  
 
Apart from testing the primary hypotheses on Europeanisation, the datasets used for this 
study can be tested against two of the above critiques. Both Schneider and Paunescu’s 
reported liberal shift in the Netherlands and Nordic countries and the bifurcation between 
Thelen’s (2014) Nordic ‘flexicurity’ and continental ‘dualisation’ should be discernible in the 
data. VoC is affirmed to the extent that these two lines of argument, which deny the 
persistence of its models, are refuted and it is challenged to the extent they are shown to be 
true. These tests, while not conclusive and resting on two narrowly focused datasets, provide 
a means of corroborating the premise of the research question. 
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2. Methodology 
This chapter sets out the methodology including the rationale for reviewing a 28-year span of 
EU integration. It argues, by reference to the literature on Europeanisation research, that 
non-EU controls provide the best way of testing Europeanisation hypotheses. It makes the 
case for using country groups as the primary unit of analysis, for focusing on coordinated 
market economies in the EU, for using Japan and Korea as comparators and for using both EU 
and non-EU liberal market economies to provide additional controls for Nordic countries. 
 
2.1 Time-period 
Given the objective of tracing often indirect impacts of European integration, a time frame 
spanning the major stages of integration and a margin for inevitably lagged institutional 
responses is desirable. These stages include the creation of the Single Market, monetary 
union, enlargement to central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Eurozone crisis and its 
aftermath. Changes to indicators of unemployment and employment protection, in so far as 
they can be attributed to European integration, are likely to be significantly lagged because, 
following Pierson (1996), welfare systems are path dependent and persistent. In addition, 
pressures for change may be more political than fiscal, stemming, as argued above, from 
welfare chauvinism that takes time to percolate through electoral politics to policy changes. 
A period from 1990 to 2018 has been selected because it covers the steps towards integration 
referred to and allows the maximum time for institutional adaptation. This is also the 
maximum period for which suitable data are available on a broadly consistent basis as is 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.2 Country case selection 
Logically, CMEs are vulnerable to the erosion of complementarity in a way that LMEs are not. 
Theoretically, the comparative advantage of LMEs, should not be undermined by cuts to 
unemployment and employment protection (although it could be hampered if increases in 
labour market regulation impeded the adaptability of firms). In LMEs, even the complete 
removal of unemployment and employment protection should not impact labour market 
complementarity with skills formation and with other domains of the political economy. 
Whatever the social and economic consequences, purely in terms of VoC theory, and 
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assuming that pervasive insecurity did not in fact hinder individuals’ investment in education, 
the incentives for general skills acquisition and higher education should be unchanged. 
MMEs, by definition, lack the institutional coherence by which labour market 
complementarity with other domains of the political economy theoretically confers 
comparative advantage. So the question of whether they face a trade-off in the same way as 
CMEs or LMEs does not arise.   
 
Haverland (2005) states that Europeanisation research should treat EU membership as an 
independent variable and that hypothesised Europeanisation effects should be tested by 
comparison of EU cases with non-EU cases. These control cases should be similar in the 
variables to be treated as constant and dissimilar in the variable to be analysed (Lijphart, 
1971).  A simple approach would be a paired comparison between a single EU CME and a 
single non-EU CME.  
 
Germany is the obvious choice of EU CME but has two shortcomings as the sole EU case. 
Firstly, the 2003-2005 Hartz reforms in Germany, which reduced the period after which the 
skilled unemployed were required to take lower-skilled jobs or even ‘mini-jobs’ supplemented 
with minimal social assistance, may have been so consequential and such a particular national 
response to the high unemployment that followed German reunification (Tooze, 2019; Dyson, 
2002) that it is anomalous among CMEs even if some reforms were, in part, preparation for 
EMU (Schnyder and Jackson, 2013) and, therefore, a Europeanisation effect at least to that 
extent. Secondly, there is a potential bifurcation among EU CMEs between continental 
conservative and Nordic social-democratic welfare regimes, a dichotomy which theoretically 
could be more consequential than the difference between EU CMEs and non-EU CMEs (see 
for example Afonso and Devitt, 2016). An alternative to Germany could be chosen from 
among Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands but, again, none stand out as a credible 
substitute given their generally small size. As Haverland notes, “why study Europeanisation if 
one does not include the most ‘important’ EU member states” (2005:2).  
 
The potentially different response of social-democratic welfare systems might be addressed 
by including Sweden, the largest of the Nordic CMEs. But Sweden also presents some 
anomalies. The ‘make work pay’ agenda implemented from 2006 was a particularly far-
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reaching set of tax cuts and social insurance reforms (Bó et al., 2018) arising from an 
essentially Kuhnian paradigm shift, with largely domestic antecedents (Schnyder & Jackson, 
2013; Vartiainen, 2001). As in Germany, left-right contestation for issue ownership (Davidsson 
and Marx, 2013; Schumacher, 2012) may also have driven Swedish reforms in ways that were 
perhaps unusual or unrepresentative of similar countries. How political partisanship 
influences welfare retrenchment is unresolved in the literature with some authors finding 
social-democratic/left governments less likely to retrench (for example, Allan and Scruggs, 
2004; Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2010) while others find little effect (Loftis and Mortensen, 2017; 
Pierson, 1996). Instances of left-of-centre governments retrenching more than right have also 
been cited (e.g. Schumacher & Vis, 2012). Whatever partisan effects are, however, their 
impact on this study is minimised by the 28 year period selected. 
 
That Germany and Sweden make potentially atypical cases is also suggested by the extent to 
which they have deregulated temporary employment, as shown in Chapter 3. In addition, 
Sweden has substantially the highest proportion of foreign-born residents among the Nordic 
countries which, as discussed earlier, may have conditioned its response in ways that are not 
typical.5 And, to invoke Haverland (2005) again, neither Denmark nor Finland appears credible 
as the sole example of its type any more than one of the smaller continental CMEs. 
 
2.3 Country group analysis 
To limit the impact of national particularities, the approach adopted is to include Germany, 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands as a continental group with Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland as a Nordic group to broadly reflect conservative and social-democratic welfare 
regimes. The study therefore compares average values of the chosen labour market indicators 
while taking account of country variations within them. Chapter 4 identifies difficulties with 
welfare regime classifications, including Esping-Andersen’s three worlds, and the imperfect 
equivalence between Nordic and continental and social-democratic and conservative. From 
the OECD unemployment benefit data used for the study, Chapter 4 shows that for 
 
5 Foreign-born populations are Sweden, 16.8%; Denmark, 10.1%; Finland, 5.7%; Austria, 17.5%,; Belgium, 
12.3%; Germany, 14.9%; Netherlands, 11.7%; Japan, 1.9%; South Korea, 2.9%. The rates for major English 
speaking countries are: Australia, 28.2%; New Zealand, 23%; US, 14.5%; Canada, 21.8%; Ireland, 15.9%; UK, 
13.2%. Source: UN, Trends in International Migrant Stock, 2015. 
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unemployment benefit at least, and with the possible exception of Austria, they were 
reasonable proxies even if the difference between them does not appear to be fundamental. 
 
Japan and Korea, both usually identified as CMEs (see for example Hall and Gingerich, 2009), 
are the most suitable comparators for EU CMEs and have broadly similar unemployment 
benefit systems (see discussion in Chapter 4). Norway and Switzerland are potential non-EU 
controls for EU CMEs but both have idiosyncrasies which can distort research findings 
(Haverland, 2005). They are small and with exceptionally high income per capita and, in any 
case, allow free movement of people either through EEA membership or the EU-Swiss 
Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons. They are therefore subject to similar pressures 
and incentives as EU members and make unconvincing controls. Haverland further argues 
that states bordering or close to the EU are likely to be subject to policy learning and diffusion 
which undermines their value as independent cases when indirect effects are being 
hypothesised as in this study. Indirect effects, Haverland states, require controls to be 
geographically distant but with enough political, institutional, and socio-economic 
similarities. Trade and language ties are as important for policy learning and diffusion as 
geographical proximity (Obinger et al., 2013). So Switzerland, for example, sharing not just a 
border but a language with Austria and Germany, is a notably poor control for this reason as 
well. The cultural and social differences between EU countries and Japan and Korea are 
potentially problematic but their size and per capita income are not dissimilar and there are 
no other suitable comparators among countries identified as CMEs in the VoC literature. An 
obvious and further difficulty is the absence of immigration pressures (see footnote on page 
20) which potentially drive retrenchment in EU and other western countries and, it has been 
argued here, may impact social-democratic welfare regimes more than conservative ones. 
Assuming Nordic countries can in fact be classified as social-democratic and continental 
countries as conservative, this means that Japan and Korea provide a better control for 
continental than for Nordic CMEs. 
 
2.4 LME control for Nordic CMEs 
The inclusion of LMEs in the study provides an additional test for Europeanisation effects. 
Insofar as Nordic CMEs have more universal welfare regimes than continental CMEs, they 
should be more susceptible to Europeanisation pressure actuated through intra-EU migration 
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than continental CMEs because benefit entitlements are less easily segmented. But liberal 
welfare regimes, resting on Hall’s (2017) ‘citizenship legitimacy’ and with generally universal, 
albeit means-tested entitlements, are also, hypothetically, susceptible to intensified 
Europeanisation pressure especially if they engender greater welfare chauvinism than more 
generous regimes, as Hall argues they do. The case for Europeanisation effects is 
strengthened if EU LMEs follow a similar path to Nordic CMEs while non-EU LMEs do not. For 
this reason, the study includes the UK and Ireland even though their susceptibility to a loss of 
institutional complementarity is not hypothesised.  Recent VoC literature classifies Ireland as 
an LEM but it has similar labour market institutions to the UK and especially to Australia and 
New Zealand which are used as non-EU LME controls (see Chapters 3 and 4). The US and 
Canada are less suitable controls because, counterintuitively and with some caveats, their 
unemployment benefit regimes are relatively conservative as discussed in Chapter 4. But they 
are included in the analysis because the distinctive positions they occupy contextualise the 
other country groups within the range of labour market regimes and, it will be argued, provide 
better examples of ‘flexicurity’ than exist in the EU. 
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3. Data sources 
This chapter explains the choice of dependent variables and datasets and provides graphical 
representations of the time series used for unemployment benefit and employment 
protection legislation. It details adjustments made to produce a continuous time series by 
combining Van Vliet and Caminada with OECD data.  
 
3.1 Choice of unemployment benefit indicator 
Unemployment benefit can be assessed either by expenditures or entitlements. Expenditure 
measures derive from aggregate spending although they can be represented on a per 
claimant or per unemployed person basis. Entitlement indicators, generally income 
replacement rates, derive more directly from political decisions, are independent, at least in 
the short run, of the level of demand and allow for measures of progressivity and universalism 
(Wenzelburger et al., 2013) and therefore enable assessments of welfare regime type which 
cannot be made from spending data. On the other hand, they are more subject to bias in the 
choice of hypothetical model family (Schmitt and Starke, 2011) and, as Table 1 shows, the 
OECD now publishes NRRs for eight family types at three previous earnings levels, all with and 
without housing supplements amounting to 48 different time series or even 672 if all the 
unemployment duration options are included. But individual protection levels, which are 
most obviously linked to the labour market incentives of VoC, are most readily assessed with 
entitlement data (Korpi and Palme, 2003). The key, therefore, is to select the single most 
appropriate NRR dataset or to aggregate different rates in a reasonable way. 
 
3.2 Choice of datasets 
Wenzelburger et al. (2013:1229) refer to the “two most prominent” comparative welfare 
datasets as Allan and Scruggs’ Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (CWED), which 
holds data from 1971 to 2011, and Korpi and Palme’s Social Citizenship Indicator Programme 
(SCIP) with data from 2001 to 2011. Starke et al. (2008), for example, use CWED. The CWED 
unemployment benefit replacement rates were updated and refined by Van Vliet and 
Caminada (2012) who produced data for 1971 to 2009 which, importantly, are in a format 
directly comparable to the OECD series which now exist for 2001 to 2018.  
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3.3 Combining datasets 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Van Vliet and Caminada and OECD  
 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that the only continuous time series that can be constructed are net 
replacement rates (NRR) 6 in the earliest phase of unemployment for a single person and for 
a one-earner couple with two children based on previous earnings at 100% of the average 
and excluding housing supplements. While Starke et al. (2008), for example, adopted the 
average NRR value for a single person and a one-earner couple with two children, the single 
person time series on its own has two advantages for this study. 
 
Firstly, the replacement rate paid to a single person best represents the institutional 
assurance of what Offe (2003:444) calls the ‘skill rent’ due to employees for their previous 
earnings. The datasets incorporate conditional elements including minimum guaranteed 
income, family allowances and housing supplements which are paid according to need and 
not previous employment status. But these do not provide the incentives identified by VoC 
and could even hinder the supply of skills through the creation of benefit traps.  Secondly, the 
single person NRR, being the simplest to calculate, is the least subject to variation arising from 
 
6 Net of taxation. 
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classifications and assumptions in the compiling methodology. Scruggs (2013) refers to the 
practical and conceptual choices that complicate the calculation of comparative entitlement 
measures while Wenzelburger et al. (2013) attribute discrepancies between CWED and SCIP 
to differing assumptions over, inter alia, family composition and the age of children. 
 
Nor do methodologies remain static. For example, between 2018 and 2019, the OECD 
retrospectively reclassified as family allowance what had hitherto been housing supplement 
in Denmark. The pre-2017 NRRs for a one-earner couple with two children excluding housing 
supplements for Denmark published in 2019 were around 40% higher than the same data 
points published in 2018, a change which moved the OECD out of line with VVC and which 
was accompanied by other reclassifications affecting other country data in different ways. 
The single person NRR therefore gives the most reliable international comparison over time 
and, crucially, the closest comparability between the two data sources being used for this 
study.  
 
An exclusive focus on the basic single person NRR, however, risks ignoring potential structural 
shifts between principles of individual status rights and redistributive effort or poverty 
reduction. Such changes in progressivity and conditionality may correlate with either 
globalisation or European integration and may have implications for VoC. To validate the 
country case selection in Chapter 2 and to test the stability of unemployment benefit regimes, 
therefore, four additional time series which include housing and family supplements and 
cover lower earnings are analysed in Chapter 4.  
 
The OECD and VVC single person NRRs are compared in Figure 1 for 2001 to 2009, the years 
for which they coincide on an average wage basis. It shows that, in general, the sources are 
very close although there are some deviations in the cases of Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and the United States which may result from OECD methodological changes 
given that the VVC series are more consistent. There is therefore a simple way to construct a 
continuous time series from 1990 to 2018 for every country in the study except Korea, which 
is not included in the VVC dataset, subject to adjustments for different earnings bases.  
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Figure 1.  Van Vliet and Caminada compared to OECD (2019),  2001–2009 
Single Person, 100% of AW, excluding housing supplements 
Time from unemployment: OECD, 2 months; VVC, 0 months 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2019) and VVC (2012), Appendix 1a and 2a. 
 
 
24 
 
3.4 Adjustment for earnings basis 
Van Vliet and Caminda data for the years before 2000 are on an average production wage 
(APW) basis only, but for 2000 to 2009 they are on both average production worker and 
average wage (AW) bases. The data extracts are included at Appendix 2a. A NRR for the 
average wage (NRRAw) which is higher than the NRR for the average production wage 
(NRRAPW) indicates that average production wages are higher than average service sector 
wages, and vice versa, because a higher NRR is just a higher proportion of a lower wage 
assuming the same nominal benefit. The difference between the two measures stems from 
differences between average production and service sector earnings and the relative weight 
of services and production in the economy, factors which are not fixed in time. The difference 
between the two indicators for the year 2000 is therefore used to adjust NRRAPW to an 
estimate of NRRAW for 1990 to 1999 because it is the closest year for which VVC give both 
measures. In five cases the differences are either zero or under one percentage point and in 
four cases, under two points. For Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK, the difference 
is between four and five points and for Sweden it was eight points (see Appendix 2b).  
 
3.5 Composite net replacement rate graphs 
Combining the estimates from Appendix 2b with the OECD data from Appendix 1a gives the 
composite NRR time series shown in Figure 2. The uneven trajectory of the curve for Sweden 
may indicate that the relatively large downward adjustment to the VVC NRRAPW is excessive 
for the early years. Trends in the difference between NRRAW and NRRAPW from 2000 to 2009 
give an insight into structural changes underway (Appendix 2d). In most cases the difference 
is relatively stable which implies that estimated NRRAW values are generally reliable for the 
earlier years. The downward trends for Sweden and Japan imply underestimates which 
suggest benefits may have been reduced from slightly higher starting points. The upward 
trends for Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands, imply a degree of overestimation and 
slightly lower starting benefit generosity. The discontinuities shown in Figure 1 are evident in 
Figure 2 and may partly reflect methodological changes by the OECD as may upward shifts in 
the Finnish NRR in 2014 and Sweden’s in 2016, both of which should be treated with caution. 
 
  
  
25 
 
Figure 2.  Unemployment net replacement rates 
Composite, Van Vliet and Caminada with OECD, 1990 – 2018 
 
 
Single Person, 100% of average wage, excluding housing supplements 
Source: Derived from Van Vliet and Caminda (2012), OECD (2019), Appendices 1a and 2b 
No OECD values are available for Canada or Korea for 2001 and 2018.   
The VVC NRRAW for 2000 is used for Canada for 2001. 
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3.6 OECD employment protection legislation dataset 
The OECD indicators of employment protection legislation strictness are compiled from 21 
measures covering regulations on dismissal notification procedures, length of notice, 
severance pay, unfair dismissals, probationary periods, compensation, extra conditions on 
collective dismissals, and controls on the use of fixed term contracts. They are available only 
for the years 1990 to 2013 so changes over this more limited period will be evaluated against 
changes in benefit generosity for the full 1990 to 2018 period. Figure 3 shows EPL strictness 
for each country. There are separate indicators for permanent and temporary contracts with 
the former largely covering requirements for dismissals and the latter, restrictions on the use 
of fixed term contracts. The units for permanent EPL (EPLP) and temporary EPL (EPLT), 
therefore, are not directly comparable but the graphs are overlaid to show the changing 
relationship between the two indicators in each country.  The data show a division between 
relatively high EPL in CMEs and lower EPL in LMEs as predicted by VoC. Japan’s comparatively 
deregulated labour market is anomalous among CMEs but, arguably, has a functional 
counterbalance in the norms of life-time employment.  
 
EU CMEs have largely maintained EPLP while EPLT has been relaxed in countries where it was 
high, notably in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Sweden. By the end of the period, a 
combination of relatively strong EPLP and limited restrictions on the use of temporary 
contracts (low EPLT) represented conditions for labour market dualisation which is 
particularly marked in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands.  
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Figure 3. OECD EPL Strictness indicators, 1990 – 2013 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2019), Appendices 3a and 3b 
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4. Unemployment benefit regimes 
This chapter highlights difficulties in applying commonly understood welfare typologies to 
unemployment benefit. It assesses unemployment benefit systems on measures of 
conservatism and liberalism to validate the use of Nordic countries as a separate category of 
EU CME and the use of Japan and Korea as comparators. It validates the use of Australia and 
New Zealand as comparators for the UK and Ireland in the additional control for Nordic CMEs. 
 
4.1 Welfare typologies 
Esping-Andersen’s three worlds of welfare are derived from aggregate decommodification 
indices across three programmes (pensions, sickness and unemployment) but scores for 
unemployment benefit are not always in line with overall scores. Unemployment benefit 
systems can not therefore be automatically categorised as liberal, conservative or social-
democratic using Esping-Andersen’s overall indices. See table 2.  
 
Table 2. Esping-Andersen’s decommodification index scores 
 
 
Canada and Ireland appear to have conservative unemployment benefit systems which rank 
above Austria, Sweden and Germany. The USA, second in Esping-Andersen’s order of liberal 
regimes, ranks above Sweden which has the highest, most social-democratic, overall score. 
Conservative Japan and Finland have among the lowest scores for unemployment benefit. 
29 
 
Nor do Esping-Andersen’s overall scores categorise all continental CMEs as conservative and 
all Nordic CMEs as social-democratic. Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands are classified as 
social-democratic and Finland as conservative. Germany is the only continental CME with a 
conservative score. Scruggs and Allan (2006), analysing overall welfare systems, find Canada 
to be as conservative as France and Japan to be liberal, something they attribute to the 
displacement of Bismarkian institutions during US occupation. Korea, was not included in 
Esping-Andersen’s study but Yang (2013) places it among the dualistic conservative regimes 
of continental Europe. For Allan and Scruggs, the concept of welfare regimes itself is 
undermined by the absence of ‘elective affinity’ between programmes and as an alternative 
to the decommodification index they put forward a ‘generosity index’ but are unconvinced 
that it points to a welfare taxonomy. Danforth (2014) finds that Esping-Andersen’s three 
worlds, which are derived from 1980 data, had lost utility even from 1990 when they were 
proposed. The liberal world, he argues, has split away from a merged social-democratic and 
conservative world, both of which have been succeeded by European, Anglo-American and 
Antipodean worlds. Esping-Andersen’s welfare regime types may, therefore, be a poor basis 
for case selection and even if the index scores for unemployment alone are used, they 
warrant up-to-date validation which includes Korea.  
 
4.2 Indicators of unemployment benefit regime 
Replacement rates at different earnings and which include housing and family elements (data 
excluded from the primary analysis in chapter 3) can highlight characteristics of 
unemployment benefit regimes which are relevant to this comparative study. Esping-
Andersen identifies liberal regimes with minimal transfers, means-testing and social 
stratification between those who rely on the state and those who make private provision. But 
the targeting of benefits means that liberal regimes are progressive (i.e. redistributive). Social-
democratic regimes, based on the principle of generous universal benefits, are also inherently 
progressive while conservative regimes are the least progressive because welfare rights 
generally attach to previous employment earnings and, in some cases, vary between 
occupational groups. The minimalist nature of liberal unemployment benefit should be 
evident in low basic replacement rates with the relative value of housing and family 
supplements providing a proxy for means-testing and social stratification. Aside from 
universal fixed child allowances, family supplements depend on circumstances while housing 
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supplements, in addition to being subject to needs assessment, also tend to cover rent and 
not the costs of home ownership which amounts to a form of private provision available to 
people who own housing equity and not to those who don’t. Conservative regimes, which 
attach entitlements primarily to employment earnings, can be expected to offer high 
unconditional replacement rates together with minimal housing and family supplements. 
Replacement rates in purely conservative systems should not change significantly with 
earnings while in liberal systems, even low but flat-rate benefits will mean higher replacement 
rates at lower than at higher earnings. Measures of progressivity and conditionality should be 
most evident in liberal systems and least evident in conservative ones with social-democratic 
regimes occupying an intermediate position by combining relatively generous basic 
replacement rates with greater responsiveness to family composition and housing need. 
 
The ratios in Figure 4 are indicative of income progressivity and the conditionality of family 
and housing supplements for 2001 and 2018 using OECD data. A comparison over the whole 
1990 to 2018 period is not possible because Van Vliet and Caminada only cover 100% of 
average earnings and exclude housing supplements. The fourth and overall ratio shows the 
maximum differential which is between the NRR for a couple with two children receiving 
housing assistance at 67% of average earnings and a single person not receiving housing 
assistance at 100% of average earnings. An income progressivity ratio of 1 indicates that 
unemployment benefit is proportional to previous income and a higher ratio, that lower 
earners receive relatively more benefit. Similarly, ratios of 1 for family and housing 
conditionality imply that these supplements are not paid and that income replacement rates 
are the same irrespective of housing and family circumstances. OECD data from 2018 included 
NRRs at 150% of average earnings, which would have provided a much clearer picture of the 
income-related incentive structure of unemployment benefit, but these data are unavailable 
at the time of writing.7   
 
 
 
7 Data fields and methodology of OECD statistics are subject to revisions which are incorporated into annual 
releases with no archive of previous releases being available. For this reason, the data extracts used for this 
study are appended. The only time series extracted prior to the 2019 release were for a one-earner couple 
with two children so it is not possible to assess income progressivity for a single person with the more 
revealing 2018 data. Nor are data from different years reliably comparable (see discussion in Chapter 3).  
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Figure 4. Progressivity and conditionality 
 
Source: Derived from OECD Benefits and Wages, 2019, Appendices 1a – 1e 
1. Income progressivity is the ratio of NRR at 67% of average earnings to the NRR at 100% of average earnings, both for 
a single person excluding housing supplements. 
2. Family conditionality is the ratio of NRR for a one-earner couple with two children to the NRR for a single person, 
both at 100% of average earnings and excluding housing supplements. 
3. Housing conditionality is the ratio of NRR including housing for a single person to the NRR for a single person 
excluding housing supplements both at 100% of average earnings. 
4. Overall progressivity and conditionality is the ratio of NRR for one-earner couple with two children at 67% of average 
earnings including housing supplements to the NRR for a single person at 100% of average earnings excluding housing 
supplements. It captures the full value of housing supplements for a one-earner couple with two children which is not 
reflected in the other ratios.  
5. The OECD does not include NRRs for Canada and Korea for 2001 and 2018 so 2002 and 2017 rates are used instead.  
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With some exceptions, income progressivity is most obvious in the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
Nordic CMEs and lowest in continental CMEs. In line with Esping-Andersen, Belgium shows 
income progressivity comparable to the other social-democratic regimes in his schema 
although the Netherlands does not. Again, following Esping-Andersen, Finland is closer to 
Germany than Denmark and Sweden. Canada, in line with Esping-Andersen’s high 
decommodification score for unemployment benefit, exhibits no income progressivity in 2001 
and a minimal degree in 2017. In the USA, Japan, Korea and Sweden, income progressivity 
has increased markedly, implying a shift to more liberal systems of unemployment benefit. 
The ratios for family and housing have remained relatively stable and are significant mostly 
in Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and, especially, the UK. Within the Anglosphere, and in line 
with Esping-Andersen and Scruggs and Allan, the US and Canada appear, for unemployment 
benefit at least, as conservative outliers with Australia, Ireland and New Zealand forming an 
intermediate group.  
 
Overlaying these progressivity and conditionality ratios with the generosity of basic 
unemployment benefit gives a clearer demarcation of regime types, see Figures 5a and 5b 
(the tight cluster of conservative countries in Figure 5a is shown in expanded view in Figure 
5b.) The top-left corner represents a liberal extreme and the bottom-right its conservative 
counterpart. It is clear the UK is a liberal outlier which has become more liberal between 2001 
and 2018. In 2018 the UK’s NRR for a single person at 100% of average earnings and excluding 
housing supplements was only 13% compared to 74% in the Netherlands. But for a one-earner 
couple at 67% of average earnings and including housing supplements the UK rate rises to 
78% and in the Netherlands, only to 83%. The UK can be relatively generous but not 
unconditionally.  
 
Ireland, Australia and New Zealand form a distinct group but one in which Ireland has become 
more conservative whilst Australia and New Zealand have become more liberal. Within the 
Anglosphere, the US and Canada appear, for unemployment benefit at least, as conservative 
outliers, a position from which the US has shifted somewhat and Canada only marginally. 
Canada occupies a position among the more conservative continental CMEs consistent with 
both Esping-Andersen and Scruggs and Allan. 
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Figure 5a and 5b.  Liberalism and conservatism in unemployment benefit 
 
 
Source: OECD and author’s calculations 
Data for Canada and Korea are 2002 and 2017 
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At the end of the study period, the most conservative countries were the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Canada. Austria and Germany have diverged from Belgium and the Netherlands 
among continental CMEs while Sweden is a liberalising outlier among the Nordic countries. 
The liberal shift in Korea has been much more marked than in Japan.  
 
In the context of general stability, liberal shifts occur more often than conservative ones 
which are evident, across both axes, in only the Netherlands and Ireland. Nordic CMEs do not 
have dramatically different unemployment benefit systems to continental CMEs although a 
bifurcation is discernible subject to two anomalies. Austria is closer to the Nordic group and 
Germany has moved towards it between 2001 and 2018. Figure 6 shows the average positions 
for VoC groups. 
 
 Figure 6. Average positions of VoC and welfare regime groups 
 
 Source: average positions from Figure 5a. 
 
4.3 Country group analysis 
Average positions and shifts obscure sometimes divergent regime profiles and trends 
including, as noted above, the simultaneous liberal and conservative shifts in the UK and 
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Ireland which is, in any case, closer to Australia and New Zealand than to the UK. It is not 
possible to identify any significant liberalising Europeanisation effects. On the contrary, the 
largest liberalisations have been outside the EU in both LMEs and CMEs while continental 
CMEs, in particular, have not shifted from the bottom right corner which represents the most 
conservative position. Japan and Korea, at least as a group, by contrast, have seen more 
marked liberalisation.   
 
4.4 Implications 
Three points from Figures 5 and 6 have implications for the study. Firstly, Korea and Japan 
appear to be reasonable comparators for both Nordic and continental CMEs which, on the 
face of it, undermines the use of LME controls for Nordic CMEs. But given these matrix 
positions do not take account of wider factors that shape regime characteristics, including 
benefit duration and qualification rules, a separate control for Nordic regimes may still be 
warranted. Secondly, Australia and New Zealand make better non-EU comparative cases for 
the UK and Ireland than the US and Canada whereas Esping-Andersen’s indices suggest the 
reverse. Thirdly, the broad picture is one of regime stability, at least between 2001 and 2018. 
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5. Evaluation of hypotheses 
This chapter sets out four hypotheses against which to assess the research question in light 
of the theoretical context, methodology, data and welfare regime chapters. It has been 
argued that changes to unemployment benefit and employment protection may undermine 
labour market complementarity in CMEs; that the likelihood of any such changes being 
Europeanisation effects should be tested using comparisons with non-EU CMEs; that Nordic 
CMEs may respond differently from continental CMEs to pressures stemming from 
internationalisation; that EU and non-EU LMEs provide a control with which to differentiate 
between Europeanisation and other pressures in Nordic CMEs; and that dualisation and 
flexicurity have been cited as ways in which institutional complementarity has been eroded. 
The following hypotheses follow from these propositions: 
 
5.1 Four hypotheses for evaluating the research question 
 
i) Extent of changes hypothesis. Changes to the indicators in Nordic CMEs should be 
greater than changes in continental CMEs which in turn should be greater than in non-
EU CME controls. And this hypothesis should be supported by a parallel change in EU 
LMEs of greater extent than in non-EU LMEs.  
 
ii) End-point hypothesis. The end-point positions of either category of EU CME should not 
retain the characteristic CME labour market configurations to a greater extent than non-
EU controls, even if they have moved further. Otherwise, general and global 
convergence pressures become a more plausible explanation.  
 
iii) Dualisation hypothesis. Labour market dualisation is a possible response to the 
pressures of internationalisation including European integration and may undermine 
incentives even for permanent employees. As Hassel notes of Germany, even in large 
firms where permanent employment is increasingly concentrated, employment security 
is “undermined by the increasing role of fringe employment” (2007:276). Following 
Thelen (2014), greater dualisation can be expected in continental than Nordic countries 
because it is a mechanism which tends to preserve corporatist status rights in line with 
dominant domestic interests. But if that pressure is Europeanisation, as opposed to 
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broader globalisation, then dualisation should, above all, be more evident in EU CMEs 
than non-EU CMEs. 
 
iv) Asymmetric/flexicurity hypothesis. From a VoC perspective, a loss of comparative 
advantage could be inferred from asymmetric changes to either unemployment or 
employment protection such that one is no longer complementary to the other, leading 
to impaired economic performance as, Molina and Rhodes (2007) argue, has been the 
case in Italy and Spain with high employment protection and low unemployment 
protection. The opposite configuration, ‘flexicurity’, generous unemployment benefit 
with low employment protection, could stem from asymmetric reform. As with 
dualisation, Thelen’s argument is that flexicurity represents an erosion of CME 
coherence which has emerged in Nordic countries because it supports high employment 
and hence the fiscal sustainability of universal welfare systems which have the support 
of dominant social groups. If asymmetric changes are driven by European integration 
then they should be more evident in EU than non-EU CMEs. 
 
Given the chronology of key stages of EU integration, the time-lag for Europeanisation 
pressures to be felt, the inertia of political processes and the path-dependence of labour 
market institutions, significant policy shifts are most plausibly explicable as Europeanisation 
effects if they occurred in the second half of the 28-year period under review. An overriding 
criterion for each the above four hypotheses to support a Europeanisation hypothesis, 
therefore, is that it was met after 2000 to 2005. 
 
5.2 Evaluation 
The above hypotheses are tested by reference to matrices of unemployment benefit in 1990 
and 2018 and employment protection legislation for permanent contracts in 1990 and 2013 
(Figures 7 and 8). Evaluation also relies on the continuous time series (Figures 2 and 3) 
including for the implications of changes to temporary employment regulation which are 
discussed in the context of dualisation. Theoretically, the ideal-type CME should be positioned 
in the top right hand corner of Figures 7 and 8, representing the complementarity of generous 
unemployment benefit with strong employment protection, and the ideal-type LME should 
be in the bottom left with low scores for both indicators. Australia and New Zealand have 
been identified as the best controls for EU LMEs but the USA and Canada are included in the  
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 Figure 7, countries (top), Figure 8, country groups (bottom). Permanent EPL and NRR.   
 
 
Source: OECD (2019) and Van Vliet and Caminada (2012) with author’s adjustments. Appendices 1a, 2b, 3a. 
Note: Canada, NRRs are 1990 and 2017. Korea, NRRs are 2002 and 2017. 
 
 
39 
 
plots because they contextualise the positions of other countries and are relevant to the 
judgements that follow. 
 
 
i) Extent of changes 
 
The extent hypothesis is not proven. Taken together EU CMEs have shifted less than Japan 
and Korea. The Nordic CME group, however, has shifted position on the matrix while the 
continental group has remained static and, arguably, the Nordic group has also shifted even 
more than Japan and Korea. But the shift is disproportionately caused by a steep cut in 
Sweden’s NRR where factors unrelated to EU integration may have driven change. EU LMEs, 
with welfare systems theoretically subject to the same pressures as Nordic systems, have not 
seen greater shifts than non-EU LMEs. So whilst the Nordic group has undergone a greater 
shift than the continental CMEs, it is difficult to infer that EU membership is a causal factor. 
 
Neither does the timing of reforms in the Nordic countries convincingly support the extent of 
change hypothesis even though the most significant changes to benefit generosity in the EU 
CMEs were in Sweden (-33%), Denmark (-15%) and Finland (-12%). In Sweden, the change has 
occurred steadily over the 1990-2018 period albeit with some fluctuations in the trend and 
possibly with even higher starting and lower endpoints (see discussion in Chapter 3). Sweden 
opened its labour market to free movement of workers from the A8 eastern accession 
countries in 2004, together with the UK and Ireland, so a causal link to changes in benefit 
levels from enlargement cannot be ruled out. In Denmark, however, the reduction in benefit 
generosity occurred largely before 2004 and, in any event, enlargement could not have 
impacted the Danish labour market until the second half of 2009 when the country lifted the 
restrictions allowed under the 2003 Accession Treaty. The time series for Finland’s NRR 
declined steadily from 1990 until around 2007 before increasing sharply from 2014 and then 
falling back again, an unlikely discontinuity which potentially reflects no more than the ‘noise’ 
of methodological changes by the OECD.  Given that Finland lifted the A8 free movement 
restriction in 2006, the recorded decline up to 2007 cannot have been associated with 
migration from eastern European member states. Looking through a possibly erroneous spike 
to 71% in 2014, Finland’s NRR increased from 51% in 2009 to 54% in 2018, a resilience 
coinciding with a period during which free movement from A8 countries could theoretically 
40 
 
have affected policy. In all EU countries, changes to EPLP have been small or occurred either 
before 2000 or before 2004 when the A8 countries joined.  
 
ii) Endpoints 
 
The endpoint hypothesis for Europeanisation is not proven. The endpoints of both continental 
and Nordic CMEs reflect the labour market indicators associated with coordination to a 
notably greater extent than the non-EU CMEs and the continental group, to a greater extent 
than the Nordic group. These country-group positions mask variations which should be 
acknowledged. Korea’s endpoint, for example, mirrors Belgium’s with the former having 
higher EPL and the latter, a higher NRR. But neither can be said to retain ideal-type CME 
indicators more than the other. The non-EU CME endpoint disguises a similar reversal, being 
the average of Japan, a low outlier for EPL, and Korea, a low outlier for NRR. But country group 
positions are nonetheless valid insofar as they represent average institutional equilibria which 
smooth out national particularities and anomalies, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
iii) Dualisation 
 
The dualisation hypothesis is not proven. Figure 3 shows that dualisation has emerged most 
clearly in Germany and Sweden and has been consolidated in the Netherlands while it is not 
evident in Japan and Korea. But this does not support a Europeanisation hypothesis because 
significant deregulation of temporary employment in EU-CMEs took place before 2000 which, 
given the likely time-lags, implies policy responses to phenomena that pre-date the Single 
Market, eastern enlargement, EMU and the Eurozone crisis. Germany and Sweden, which 
Chapter 2 identified as potentially anomalous cases, stand out for a stark reversal of 
permanent and temporary EPL indicators commencing in the 1990s while in Denmark, the 
same reversal occurred abruptly in 1991 and an equally abrupt and significant cut to EPLT in 
Belgium occurred in 1998. In Sweden, four-fifths of the deregulation occurred before 1997 
and a fifth occurred in 2008. In Germany half the EPLT deregulation occurred between 1995 
and 1998 and half in 2003 as part of the Hartz I & II reforms. These reforms, moreover, broadly 
coincided with parallel liberalisations in Korea and Japan which, again, points more to the 
pressures of globalisation or to particularly domestic factors than to those arising from EU 
integration. While the combination of relatively high EPLP with deregulated EPLT, logically 
41 
 
associated with dualisation, occurs only among EU CMEs, it is not a novel development having 
pertained in Austria, Finland and, most clearly, the Netherlands from at least 1990. Its striking 
emergence in Germany and Sweden might be more explicable as the unravelling of special 
cases of coordination under the pressures of European integration had it occurred later. 
 
iv) Asymmetric shifts and flexicurity 
 
Asymmetric shifts including towards flexicurity do not provide evidence of Europeanisation. 
The clearest example of a greater shift in one indicator than the other occurs in Sweden where 
a notable reduction in benefit generosity is matched by a relatively marginal shift in 
permanent EPL strictness. Denmark follows the same pattern to a lesser extent. In any case, 
Figure 2 shows that around half the NRR cut in Sweden and all of it in Denmark occurred 
before around 2005. Counter to Thelen (2014), these are shifts away from flexicurity because 
they entail benefit cuts and stable EPL and not the other way round. Canada and, to a lesser 
extent, the US provide better examples of flexicurity and within the EU, Belgium comes 
closest to the definition. Even there, an increase in benefit generosity occurred in a context 
of stable EPLP. Reductions to EPLT in combination with relatively generous unemployment 
benefit are discussed above in the context of dualisation.  
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6. Discussion 
The data show shifts in labour market indicators which could be construed as a loss of 
institutional coherence for EU CMEs and therefore as a loss of comparative advantage. 
Unemployment protection has been reduced in Nordic CMEs while employment protection 
has been reduced in both continental and Nordic CMEs although in large part through the 
deregulation of temporary employment and, in some countries, the emergence of a dualised 
labour market. Countries associated with social-democratic unemployment benefit regimes, 
broadly, the Nordic CMEs, appear to have undergone greater transformations than those 
associated with conservative regimes, generally, the continental CMEs. 
 
But comparison with non-EU CMEs does not support the hypothesis that these developments 
can be attributed to EU integration for five reasons. First, because, with the exception of a 
degree of dualisation most evident in the EU, EU CMEs have undergone more limited erosion 
of the labour market institutions associated with non-market coordination than have non-EU 
CMEs. The relative overall stability of EU CMEs masks greater shifts in Nordic countries but 
these are more plausibly attributable to pressures other than EU membership. Second, 
notwithstanding the putative pressures of EU integration or, either alternatively or 
additionally, of globalisation and liberalisation, labour market institutions in EU CMEs remain 
closest to the ideal-type. Nordic CMEs as a group have shifted away from ideal-type positions 
while the continental CME group has not but they also maintain the ideal-type to a greater 
extent than non-EU CMEs. Third, dualisation, which potentially confounds these conclusions, 
was set in train through deregulation of temporary employment before Europeanisation 
effects could realistically take hold. Fourth, the loss of VoC complementarity through 
asymmetric reforms including towards flexicurity, where it is evident, generally took place too 
early to be associated with EU membership. Fifth, and finally, the unemployment benefit 
regime analysis in Chapter 4 shows that EU CMEs maintained broadly stable conservative 
unemployment benefit regimes between 2001 and 2018 with no compelling indication of the 
greater liberalisation in EU than non-EU CMEs that would support a Europeanisation 
hypothesis. The metrics adopted in Chapter 4 show the Nordic CME group has liberalised to 
a small degree while the continental CME group has not. But these shifts are mirrored in non-
EU CMEs, EU LMEs and non-EU LMEs, albeit with some variance from the averages, and this 
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points to wider pressures than EU integration and, arguably, confirms the greater 
susceptibility of Nordic welfare regimes to such pressures. 
 
Against the research hypothesis, there are reasonable arguments that the EU may instead act 
as a bulwark against, or haven from, the pressures of liberalisation stemming from 
globalisation. If the EU is an agent of intensified internal competition which might undermine 
national institutions, it also shelters producers from unfettered global competition through 
tariff and non-tariff barriers in sectors ranging from agriculture and food products to cars and 
car parts. Its economic weight confers greater power to set the terms of trade with the rest 
of the world than even the largest member states could hope to wield alone. And its rank as 
a regulatory superpower with the US and China means that it competes to set the technical 
standards on which strategic advantage in new technologies and sectors can hinge and it can 
do so to the advantage of firms in the EU (Beattie, 2019). EU law maintains relatively high 
labour standards even if conditions have been undermined by some CJEU rulings including 
Viking and Laval. And while the CJEU has not stood in the way of labour market dualisation, 
it does ensure equal treatment of permanent and temporary workers (de la Porte and 
Emmenegger, 2017). 
 
Chapter 1 identifies two critiques in the literature that can be tested on the datasets. To the 
extent they fail to be substantiated, the VoC lens though which this study approaches a 
question of Europeanisation may be vindicated. Firstly, the transformation from co-
ordination to liberalism in the Nordic countries and Netherlands which Schneider and 
Paunescu (2012) identify between 1990 and 2005 is not corroborated by the two indicators 
tracked in this study even though it spans 13 more years. Among continental CMEs, and in 
the context of high or stable permanent EPL, there have in fact been increases in replacement 
rates in the Netherlands and Belgium. Nor are the Nordic reforms so extensive that they 
amount to a transition to liberalism comparable to any LME. And as a group, the Nordic 
countries remain in a more conservative position than the average for Korea and Japan, an 
average which also remains clearly distinct from the LME cases included.  
 
Among the indicators tracked by Schneider and Paunescu, the most significant changes that 
drove category shifts were to employment protection and the ratio of university education to 
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occupational training among young cohorts. Figure 3 shows that permanent employment 
protection has been broadly stable in all four countries while temporary employment 
regulation has been relatively low and stable in Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands since 
at least 1990 or very shortly afterwards in the case of Denmark. Only in Sweden has 
temporary employment regulation been dramatically reduced after that time, and then 
mostly by 1997. To the extent the transformation to LME in these countries reflects changes 
to employment protection, the OECD EPL data suggest a transformation which predates the 
most consequential phases of both globalisation and European integration and which 
occurred before publication of Hall and Soskice’s Varieties of Capitalism in 2001 which first 
proposed the VoC categories. Nor is the shift to university education, the second pillar of 
Schneider and Paunescu’s argument, uncontested as an indicator of a transformation to LME. 
Thelen (2019) argues that in Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, increasing rates of 
university education reflect a transition towards the knowledge economy. In the Netherlands, 
for example, she links the increasing emphasis on university education to a structural shift 
from manufacturing to newly dominant finance and high-value services, sectors usually 
associated with LMEs, even as the economy retains a high degree of coordination. That a 
successful combination of coordination with knowledge-intensive services may expose the 
limits of VoC as a theoretical framework is a difficulty Thelen highlights. But on balance the 
basis of Schneider and Paunescu’s observation is either weakly supported in the data used for 
this study or capable of alternative interpretations. 
 
The second critique of VoC that can be tested on the data is the emergence of both Nordic 
flexicurity and continental dualism which Thelen (2014) posits as new phenomena that call 
into question the theoretically foundational stability of VoC types. As argued above, this study 
shows that, if anything, the Nordic experience has been away from flexicurity, a term which 
more accurately describes the labour markets of the USA and Canada.  Equally, the EPL data 
suggest that labour market dualism is neither a new nor an exclusively continental 
phenomenon even if appears to be an exclusively European one, albeit not one linked to EU 
integration. That neither critique is well supported in the data provides an additional point of 
empirical validation for VoC theory and is consistent with the principal finding that labour 
market institutions in EU CMEs have maintained complementarity with coordination across 
other domains of the economy. 
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To the extent the conjectured instability wrought by unravelling social bargains in CMEs was 
unfounded, barriers to adjustment in MMEs and the implications for domestic social bargains 
may be more real. Hall’s (2014) argument that MMEs were unable to adjust to the 
convergence pressures of monetary union is the logical flip-side of the resilience of CMEs. The 
Eurozone crisis was staunched with a range of measures including potentially unsustainable 
monetary intervention but the loss of competitiveness which MMEs have been unable to 
offset with devaluation has long-term fiscal and political implications which remain 
unresolved and which appear most acute in Italy. The EU’s historically unprecedented 
combination of supra-national rights and national social bargains may threaten its long-term 
stability unless supported by institutions that give substance to Caporaso and Tarrow’s 
‘supranational embedded liberal compromises’. An obvious starting point would be a 
common unemployment benefit regime but the opposition to one is formidable precisely 
because it threatens the national embedded compromises it seeks to displace. 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation sought to identify possible Europeanisation effects in two key labour market 
institutions in EU countries which could potentially undermine the coherence of the 
coordination regimes described by VoC. It focused on CMEs where, it was argued, the 
hypothesised impacts would be felt and where they might undermine support for EU 
integration and present a challenge to the stability of the EU. The postulated effects were not 
found in either unemployment benefit or employment protection or in the complementarity 
of one to the other, which both counters the main research hypothesis and attests to the 
persistence of national models that VoC predicts.  
 
Limitations and imperfections in the data and the methodology on which these conclusions 
rely should be acknowledged. The study necessarily hinges on a comparison of seven EU CMEs 
with only Japan and Korea, in which significant cultural and structural differences pertain, 
while, in addition, unemployment benefit data for Korea cover only 2002 to 2017. The choice 
of a 1990 start-point rather than 2001 is vindicated by the timing of key reforms but the 
composite time series used is potentially subject to errors in adjusting for the difference 
between average wages and average production wages. The calculation of net replacement 
rates is, in any case, complex, as discussed in Chapter 3, and some recorded shifts may stem 
from methodological noise rather than actual policy changes. As Wenzelburger et al. caution, 
welfare research should be “data-conscious” and “humble in its claims” (2013:1229). The 
exclusive focus on a single net replacement rate is a simplification, albeit, it is argued, a 
justified one. Meanwhile, it is possible that recent and material changes to employment 
protection are not captured by the OECD EPL indicators which only cover the years to 2013. 
 
The presentation of data in graphical formats clearly highlights the structural bifurcations and 
shifts at issue and it follows Lijphart’s advice that comparative studies should aim for 
parsimony in the number of variables even if they have to settle for “mid-range propositions” 
(1971:690). But it is largely restricted to bivariate analysis and further research could usefully 
encompass a wider set of factors including indicators which specify unemployment benefit 
regimes with more precision. A statistical multi-variate analysis could take account of changes 
to active labour market policies, waiting periods, benefit duration or duration before lower 
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skilled jobs must be taken, all of which vary between countries and shape incentives in the 
labour market. Finally, this research agenda could extend to a broader set of VoC coherence 
indicators by evaluating Europeanisation effects on the complementarity of a wider set of 
institutions within and across other domains of the economy.   
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